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Abstract 
The growth and development of any nation is greatly dependent on the availability of basic public infrastructure and services. 
The public Private Partnerships (PPP) has been in use for almost two decades helping developed countries improve their 
infrastructure stock to achieve their economic goals. Despite the link between infrastructure availability and economic growth, 
developing countries are yet to achieve adequate infrastructure provision to assist their quest for economic growth. Therefore, 
this study set out to determine the reasons for the slow adoption of the PPP procurement strategy in Nigeria through a survey of 
construction professionals. It was found that corruption in government was the major problem. Factor analysis further revealed 
five factors namely Government policy on infrastructure, Lack of consensus among policy makers, Political instability, Lack of 
understanding of the PPP concept, and High participation costs.
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1. Introduction 
Public private partnerships (PPP) or Private Finance initiatives (PFI) as it is known in some countries has 
become the ‘silver bullet’ with which governments across the globe solve their infrastructure problems. The 
practice has been widely accepted to the extent that whole local government services were contracted to the private 
sector in Denmark’s Farum local government [1]. International financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF 
have also used it as a loan condition while donor agencies like the EU, USAID and DfID employ it as condition for 
aid [2].The impetus for the adoption of PPP resulted in part due to the failure of civil servants to effectively deliver 
and maintain public services and corruption in public procurement. In developing countries, the main driver for 
private participation has been the inability of tax revenue to close the financing gap for infrastructure needs. 
Private provision is also argued to provide better value for money and leads to benefitting from private sector 
management expertise [3]. While literature tends to treat Privatization and PPP as two separate forms of 
infrastructure provisions, one good differentiating factor between the two is the presence of a regime of state price 
regulation [4]. However, in most regions, the use of the term privatization evokes memories of everything that is 
wrong with private involvement in infrastructure; hence governments have become fearful of using the word 
privatization[5]. Public Private Partnerships is a partnership that leverages private funding and the strengths of 
private entrepreneurship and management, for the maximum provision of public services in a climate of scarce 
resources. PFI is a PPP special case where all the finance needed for the capital funding and its basic operation is 
supplied by the private sector in return for a service charge[6]. This public procurement strategy has grown so fast 
that over 45 agencies and units have been created worldwide to specifically deal with PPP related contracts[7]. 
Multi-lateral institutions also have dedicated agencies delegated to oversee PPP issues, for instance PPIAF for the 
World Bankand EPEC for the European Union. In the UK, where contemporary literature attributes the evolution 
of PPP in 1992, over 717 contracts have been signed to date[8] and they still remains the largest PPP market 
globally [9]. However, despite being used as a condition for loans by international financial institutions, and 
condition for Aids by donor agencies, there has been a slow move towards this infrastructure provision strategy in 
developing countries. Therefore this paper, reporting the results of a survey, seeks to uncover the major reasons for 
this slow adoption and possible solutions from the view point of construction professionals working in public and 
privatesectors in Nigeria. 
2. Potentials of public private partnerships 
The private sector has always been in co-operation with the public sector for the provision of public 
infrastructurein the areas of road construction, railways, and buildings as contractors. In terms of consultancy, the 
private sector has also been very active in the area of consulting for the public sector. However, with population 
explosions in most developing countries over the last two decades due to improved healthcare technologies, there 
arose a competition from other sectors of the economy for the meager tax revenues accruing to governments. 
Governments in response have sought to seek alternative means of financing the much needed infrastructure while  
ensuring that it fulfills its other numerous responsibilities to its citizens, hence the  move towards PPPs. Therefore, 
it could be said that the most important reason till date for the adoption of the PPP strategy in both developed and 
developing economies was solely constraint on government revenue [10]. Although the practice of PPP or 
concessions has been used in the past for the Perrier brothers’ concession in Paris and the Suez Canal, the rationale 
for their use then was not stated or espoused. However, in recent years the PPP has been attributed with many 
positive benefits which include creating a private sector-led economy,hastening development, reducing project life-
cycle costs, promoting national economic growth and improving national infrastructure[11]. It is also said to 
deliver better value for money than the traditional procurement [12], and aids in the transfer of technological 
knowledge to local enterprises [13]. The PPP is also a response to the rising marginal cost of state funded 
investments in public services imposed by global capital markets [14]. Most importantly, the PPP has been found 
to help improve on the management of the twin risks of time and cost overruns better than the traditional 
procurement method [6].  As noted by National Audit Office in its report ‘Construction Performance’, it showed 
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that the PPP performs better than the traditional procurement route interms of cost and time certainty as expressed 
in table 1below: 
Table 1: Savings from the PFI Source: [15] 
                                                   Previous experience                                    PFI experience      
                                                (modernizing construction 1999)            (2002 NAO Census) 
Construction projects where  
cost to the public exceeds                     73%                                                     22% 
price agreed at contract  
 
construction projects 
 delivered late to public sector             70%                                                       24% 
 
Furthermore, the PPP has helped countries reduce their bureaucratic burden as staff are transferred to the private 
sector once they take over provision of services in any sector. To this extent, in malaysia for example, 113,440 
have been transferred from the government’s balance sheetto the private sector with an accompanying savings of 
RM7.79 billion annually on operating expenditure or $200 billion in 25 years; and RM161 billion in capital 
expenditure. In the UK also, over 35,000 staff were transferrd to the private sector through PPP deals [16]. The 
degree to which this procurement strategy has been employed globally has areached a scale which is big enough to 
have macroeconomic and systemic significance in a number of countries [17]. Despite these espoused benefits of 
adopting PPPs, many African countries and Nigeria in particular have found it difficult to make any progress in 
this respect. 
2.1. Growth factors for PPP in developing countries 
Although the PPP has been touted as being an efficient tool for infrastructure improvement across all sectors, 
like any good concept, it has its short-comings. The market for PPP procurement strategy has grown over the years 
that in 2004, 205 national PPP contracts were signed worldwide involving $52 billion [18]. But given the fact that 
one of the major reasons for this strategy is the constraint on public sector revenues, it is not expected that resource 
rich counries like Nigeria would find PPPs attractive. However, Nigeria has been struck by the ‘Dutch Disease’, 
which is a condition where a significant portion of citizens in a resource rich country suffer more than countries 
without any resources. Nigeria’s national earnings from oil and gas have risen tremendously over the last three 
decades, from 26.3% in 1970 to 83.5% in 2000[19]; but public services and infrastructure have also been 
deteriorating fast in the opposite direction. Awarded contracts have either been bedeviled by the twin curse of time 
and cost overruns or are clearly abandoned by contractors due to non-payments by government. Under this 
condition, the PPP seem to be a very effective tool to overcome these anomalies. However, in order to implement a 
successful PPP process, there are pre-requisites which must be on ground to facilitate the process; top among them 
is the availability of competent construction contractors in a countries’ construction industry. The range of tasks 
undertaken before final service provision requires the construction of an asset before service delivery [20]. In a 
recent study of the critical success factors for PPPs in Nigeria, it was found that PPP legislation, cost-benefit 
analysis and creating the right environment were critical for PPP success [21]. In the transport sector, it has been 
argued that legislation, regulation, creating conducive environment, forging partnerships with the private sector 
and other stakeholders in policy formulation, reform and implementation were critical success factors in urban 
transport PPP in Nigeria [22].Financial institutions in Nigeria were also assessed on their PPP risk bearing capacity 
and were found to be risk-averse and would rather seek to transfer risks to other parties [23]. However, beyond risk 
transfer, the business environment and legislations, there are a number of other requirements needed for PPPs to 
thrive. 
Political stability is an essential factor in any development process, and this happens to be one of the most 
distinguishing factors between developing and developed countries. Political stability does not mean the absence of 
violence alone; it also includes program continuity,which is responsible for development failures in developing 
countries. Too often, new leadership tends to see discontinuing the previous government’s programs as their first 
act in office [24] thereby creating additional risks for PPP investors. Following on political stability, there is a need 
to have strong local banks able to finance large scale infrastructure projects alone or in conjunction with external 
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lenders. Usually, the consortium is a collection of different investment stakeholders which include a bank or group 
of banks providing debt for the construction and operation of the facilities[25]. Having local banks is important to 
build a good public support base for the projects. In China for instance, foreign firms or international financial 
institutions rather than domestic institutions that have been involved in PPP projects [26]. Government policy has 
been shown to be one of the most important pre-requisites for the success of PPP, and apart from policy support, 
government can also assist through providing a capital subsidy in the form of one-time grant or jointly sharing 
some portion of the capital investment [25]. In Malaysia for instance, the government has put in place 
anRM20billion Facilitation Fund (FF) to assist PPP investors wishing to invest in certain critical sectors of the 
economy. Other forms of support may include interest rates policy, tax breaks and creation of an ‘independent’ and 
credible regulatory environment that will boost investor confidence[27]. Guaranteeing demand, allowing automatic 
cost-pass through in energy pricing, and assuming foreign exchange risks are also some of the ways government 
policy can help encourage investors. 
Although PPP is not a panacea for solving all the problems of the construction industry and infrastructure in 
particular, but its emphasis on the use of risk management, value management, integrated design and construction, 
life-cycle costing, and collaborative relationships; makes it an exceptional form of procurement. Large complex 
mega projects, due to their huge investments require a lot of contractual safeguards to protect both parties to the 
contract from exploitation by either party, more often than not there will be points of ambiguity or even 
disagreement between them [28]. However, the availability of outlets for dispute resolution which are seen to be 
credible and respected by all parties goes a long way in inducing private investments in infrastructure. 
A careful plan is required by a host government in the course of deciding to enter into a PPP contract. This plan 
should properly assess the presence of competing publicly financed projects which might affect the demand for the 
privately financed one.  Instances have occurred where government sought to generate demand for a privately 
financed toll road by closing a publicly financed one to traffic in Australia. The response to such actions by 
government especially in developing countries, where tolls are unpopular, cannot be correctly predicted in 
advance. The protests that were generated from tolling on the Skye toll bridge in the UK and the Vasco Da Gama 
Bridge in Portugal are good examples of public outrage to tolls. Consequently public support has been shown to be 
crucial for PPP and any other public project [29]&[30]. Although, PPP promised improved efficiency, social 
benefits and lower levels of corruption [31]; critics have often suggested that it is a controversial and problematic 
approach to capital development in the public sector (Raune, 2000) cited in [13]. This is because it involves large 
expatriate companies executing projects that are overpriced in their opinion. Also in a recent survey to determine 
the benefits that have been achieved using the PPP model, the elimination of corruption was the least ranked 
benefit suggesting that PPPs have evolved their own channels of corruption [32]. Furthermore, [33] also found that 
private providers in the UK health sector were making profits in excess of the agreed levels. 
Although, there is no fool-proof technique in crafting a successful PPP [34], the long duration associated with 
PPP contracts require a clear procurement policy with provision for changes, resolving disputes, risk management, 
contract pricing, performance incentives and exit strategies [3]. Other barriers to the growth of PPP that have been 
identified include inadequate public sector expertise in planning and implementing PPP projects [35], [36] and 
[37]. Financing, operating, maintaining and investing in long-term assets are not familiar activities to construction 
contractors[13] and [38]. Existing public sector employees responsible for the delivery of public sector projects are 
also complicit in the slow growth of the PPP as they percieve it as a threat to their continued employment. 
Complicating issues further is the huge diversity of tribes across many of the countries in sub-saharan Africa, this 
diversity rather than be a source of strength, is often a recipe for competition among policy makers wishing to 
please their people. Government failures may also occur in the many cases in which politicians, bureaucrat, and the 
individuals or groups who influence them give priority to their own private interests rather than the public interest 
[39]. 
Finally, the high cost of participation hasalso resulted in decreasing the number of willing project companies. 
Bidding costs have been estimated to be a little below 3 %  of the estimated final cost of projects [12] and 5-15% 
of construction cost for consultants on a single PPP project (p.173), which is high going by the size and costs of 
most PPP projects. The author goes further to reveal that the bidding costs on the london underground was in the 
area of £300 million. However, compensation is now being recommended where work is required in the detailed 
design stages of several bidders so that it would encourage them to submit proposals when next they are called 
upon [6].  
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3. Methodology 
In total, about 14 barriers to the growth of PPPs were identified from literature and a questionnaire was 
designed based on these. In order to gather data for this study, 100 postal questionnaires where sent out to 
construction professionals working within the country’s capital city Abuja. The selected respondents comprise 
Architects, Engineers, Quantity Surveyors, Project managers and contractors. One of the guiding factors for 
choosing this city is because it is the seat of government and these professionals being in the same city interacts 
with the government through contracts and consultancy works. Therefore, they are in a position to be better 
informed than their counterparts in other states in Nigeria. The respondents were asked to rate the factors they 
considered responsible for the slow adoption of PPPs Nigeria on a 5-point likert scale. The scale was designed with 
1 being strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree and 5 = strongly agree. A total of 
61 questionnaires were returned representing 61% valid responses which is comparable with the 60 responses upon 
which [40] based their analysis. IBM SPSS statistical software version 20 was used to analyses the responses and 
draw inference.  
4. Results and Discussions 
From the data collected, it was found that, among the respondents, there were 31 public sector employees and 
30 private sector employees. In terms of professional affiliations, 8 respondents were Architects, 22 were 
Engineers, 14 were Quantity Surveyors, 7 were project managers, 2 were contractors and 8 covered other 
professions like town planners, estate managers etc. The respondent’s academic qualifications show that 5 had PhD 
degree, 20 had M.Sc./MBA, 27 had B.Sc., and 8 had a Diploma while 1 had ‘other’ certificate type. The 
respondents’ years of experience were also assessed to determine their suitability to be credible respondents. From 
their responses, 15 had about 3 years of experience, 16 had about 6 years of experience, and 10 had about 10 years 
of experience while 20 had over 11 years of experience. From the profile of the respondents, it can be seen that 
they are qualified to give valid opinion on the subject matter with about 75% having over 5 years industry 
experience, 85% having a degree and all the respondents were professionals in the various construction disciplines. 
The reliability test conducted to determine the internal consistency of the measuring instrument returned a 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of Į=.776. A minimum Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .70 is recommended [41] . As 
for the validity of the measuring instrument, it is simply the square roots of the reliability co-efficient [42] p.294; 
hence the validity for this data is .881. He went on to affirm that validity is the quality of a test such that it 
measures what it says it does (p.389). 
A test of normality was conducted on the data to determine the type of distribution and it returned a sig. value 
of p>.05 for Kolmogorov-Smirnov and p=.254 for Shapiro-Wilk. The results suggest that the distribution is not 
different from a normal distribution. Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test values were close to being 
significant, the Shapiro-Wilk is a more powerful test  [43]. From the above results, all other subsequent tests will 
be limited to parametric procedures. To test whether there was a difference in opinion across sector, the t-test for 
independent means was conducted to compare private and public sector perceptions. The t-tests allow the 
comparison of the means of two normally distributed populations using samples drawn randomly and 
independently from each other [44].The t-test indicated that the means did not differ significantly at p =.107. The 
result suggests that there is no difference in ranking across both sectors on the causes of slow PPP adoption in 
Nigeria. It is a good thing that both sectors agree on what the problem is and this would make it easier to arrive at a 
consensus solution.  
Further tests were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) which compares the means of more than 
two independent groups [41]. The parameters compared includeprofessional disciplines, qualifications and years of 
practice in the industry. The results for ANOVA on professional disciplines (p =.421) reveals that there was no 
statistically significant difference across professions in their perception of causes of slow growth of PPPs in 
Nigeria. There was also no statistically significant difference (p=.208) when comparison was based on 
qualifications. And a further comparison based on the number of years of industry experience also suggests that 
there was no significant difference (p =.069) as a result of the respondent’s years of industry experience. These 
results bode well for developing countries and especially Nigeria where the respondents are based. This is because 
193 AbdulGaniyu Otairu et al. /  Procedia Engineering  77 ( 2014 )  188 – 195 
having a consensus on the main reasons for the slow uptake of PPPs is a first step towards identifying how to 
overcome the problems. Using the mean score of the various variables to rank the causes reveals that ‘corruption in 
government’ is the most severe cause of slow PPPs adoption in Nigeria as shown in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Mean Score Ranking of Barriers to PPPs 
  Barriers to PPPs  
Mean 
Score 
1 Corruption in government 4.55 
2 Government policy on infrastructure 3.92 
3 Policy makers lack of consensus 3.85 
4 Lack of security 3.78 
5 High participation cost 3.57 
6 Political instability 3.40 
7 Absence of strong financial institutions 3.27 
8 Absence of a clear contract 3.20 
9 Inefficient construction industry 3.12 
10 Lack of understanding of PPP concept 3.07 
11 Ineffective & respectable judiciary 3.05 
12 Absence of public support 2.92 
13 Fear of unemployment 2.88 
14 Presence of competing project 2.68 
 
‘Government policy on infrastructure’ was ranked in second place by the respondents and this re-echoes the 
assertions of [27]that government policy has a great influence on the success of large infrastructure PPPs. In third 
place is ‘lack of consensus among policy makers’, this is especially true for Nigeria with very diverse ethnic 
groups amidst a population of about 160 million people. The upper and lower legislative houses of parliament has 
about 469 parliamentarians all representing different ethnicities and tribes. Lack of adequate security ranked in 
fourth place. This is understandable as kidnapping of foreign construction executives in return for huge ransoms 
has become a means of livelihood for the growing number of unemployed graduates. Foreign investors are wary of 
working in certain parts of the country; it is an issue of concern to everyone. ‘High participation cost’ was ranked 
in fifth place. 
‘Lack of understanding of PPP concept’, which is a problem that has bedevilled even those in developed 
countries was ranked in faraway tenth place. The lack understanding of the concept has been referred to by [35], 
[36] and [37]. However, given the importance of the construction industry to the success of PPPs, it is surprising 
that ‘inefficient construction industry’ did not rank very high among the variables. A possible explanation for this 
could be because the respondents are all involved in the construction industry, ranking ‘inefficient construction 
industry’ high would be like passing a negative verdict on their capacity. Also, despite the strong consensus among 
researchers on the importance of public support to PPPs [29]&[30], it is surprising that ‘absence of public support’ 
was ranked so low in 12th place. However, one of the reasons this might have happened would be because of the 
scant PPP experience among Nigerian construction professionals and the country at large. 
Finally, a factor analysis was performed on the data. Factor analysis is a data reduction technique which takes a 
large set of variables and summarizes them using a smaller set of factors or components [41]. After performing the 
factor analysis procedure, it returned 5 factors; these were further rotated in order to enhance interpretability of the 
components[44].  The factors were then named using the component with the highest loading values in each case, 
therefore, the factors responsible for the slow growth of PPPs according to this study include: 
1) Government policy on infrastructure 
2) Lack of consensus among policy makers 
3) Political instability 
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4) Lack of understanding of the PPP concept 
5) High participation costs 
5. Conclusions 
The PPP infrastructure procurement strategy is an effective tool for the procurement of public infrastructure in 
the presence of public sector financial constraints. It is a suitable infrastructure provision strategy for countries 
constrained by tax revenue with which to provide infrastructure to sustain economic growth. This study sought to 
determine the causes for the slow adoption of PPPs in developing countries with focus on Nigeria. While the 
results show that corruption in government was a major cause, factor analysis has shown that there are five main 
factors responsible for the slow uptake of PPP. Another interesting finding from this study is that there is a 
consensus among construction professionals across both sectors on the barriers to adopting PPPs. This 
convergence, it is hoped would make for easy dialogue in charting the way forward for infrastructure provision in 
Nigeria. Although the study sample may not be large for effective generalization of the results, most countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa bear similar characteristics. Therefore, developing country governments wishing to improve 
their stock of infrastructure through the PPP strategy must fight corruption in public procurement first before it can 
succeed in its quest to establish successful PPPs. Finally, governments should review their infrastructure policies to 
encourage private investors while at the same time creating opportunities for training on PPP procurement for its 
staff. 
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